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Abstract
The restructuring of health insurance contracts and health care delivery systems under managed care is the
result of competitive attempts to reduce the inefficiencies that developed in medical markets under traditional
indemnity insurance. Liability rules that continue to apply norms of customary care threaten to undermine
these potential efficiency gains. Liability rules under managed care should treat claims for denial of coverage as
contractual disputes, to be brought against health plans as residual claimants. Where contracts are ambiguous,
appropriate coverage should be determined using a cost-benefit criterion based on beneficiaries’ willingness-
to-pay. Liability claims for negligent care should be permitted only against providers, not against health plans,
except where the plan voluntarily assumes liability by contract. Extending liability for negligent care to health
plans is likely to distort liability decisions and constrain the competitive evolution of delivery systems. These
principles should apply equally to all plans, regardless of their status under the Employer Retirement Income
Security Act.
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The restructuring of health insurance contracts and health care delivery systems
under managed care is the result of competitive attempts to reduce the inefficiencies
that developed in medical markets under traditional indemnity insurance. Liability
rules that continue to apply norms of customary care threaten to undermine these
potential efficiency gains. Liability rules under managed care should treat claims
for denial of coverage as contractual disputes, to be brought against health plans as
residual claimants. Where contracts are ambiguous, appropriate coverage should be
determined using a cost-benefit criterion based on beneficiaries’ willingness-to-pay.
Liability claims for negligent care should be permitted only against providers, not
against health plans, except where the plan voluntarily assumes liability by contract.
Extending liability for negligent care to health plans is likely to distort liability de-
cisions and constrain the competitive evolution of delivery systems. These princi-
ples should apply equally to all plans, regardless of their status under the Employer
Retirement Income Security Act.
I. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to examine the implications for liability of
the growth of managed care. Since the 1980s, the development of managed
care has led to fundamental change in the nature of health insurance con-
tracts and in the structure of medical care delivery systems. For patients,
managed care entails accepting restrictions on choice of providers and con-
trols on covered services, in return for lower premiums and copayments.
For providers, managed care establishes risk-sharing forms of reimburse-
ment in place of the unrestricted fee-for-service or cost-based reimburse-
ment contracts used by traditional indemnity insurance.
This transformation of health insurance contracts parallels fundamental
restructuring and consolidation of health care delivery systems. By one
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count, 1,318 health care acquisitions and an additional 2,152 joint ventures
took place between 1989 and 1993. These include horizontal, vertical, and
conglomerate mergers and alliances: hospitals with other hospitals, both
contiguous and in distant geographic markets; hospitals and physician
group practices; hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers; health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs) with other HMOs; and HMOs with traditional
insurance companies.
The growth of managed care and the associated restructuring of insur-
ance contracts and medical delivery systems can be viewed as a competitive
response of insurance markets to the demand for forms of medical insur-
ance that provide better value for the money than traditional indemnity in-
surance contracts. Traditional indemnity insurance gave patients un-
restricted choice of providers and reimbursed providers on a fee-for-service
basis. Thus the only constraint on ‘‘moral hazard’’ (insurance-induced
overuse of services) was patient copayment. The essential features of man-
aged care are the use by third party payers of new techniques for moral
hazard control, often involving provider-targeted incentives and discretion-
ary restrictions on reimbursable services through utilization review. Man-
aged care thus offers new forms of contract for insured medical care that
are preferred by at least some consumers. Managed care plans differ in the
details of their restrictions on choice, copayments, access to new technolo-
gies, and cost. The growing market share of various types of managed care
plans is compelling evidence that a significant fraction of consumers are
willing to forgo some choice in return for the lower premium and lower
out-of-pocket payments that managed care can offer.
These managed care constraints are generating new types of liability
claims arising out of the apparent integration of insurance and provider
functions, as plans become more actively involved in decisions about reim-
bursable care and providers become more involved in risk sharing. Claims
against managed care organizations (MCOs) raise two broad questions.
First, under what circumstances, if any, should there be liability for with-
holding care? If there is liability, on whom should it be placed—the plan,
the provider, or the utilization review entity? Second, under what circum-
stances, if any, should the plan—in addition to the individual provider—be
liable for negligent care by providers that participate in the plan?
The liability of health plans appears to be growing. Between 1990 and
1994 there were at least 33 punitive damage awards against health insurers
and MCOs, and almost half were for $1 million or more.1 However, the
1 Brent J. Graber, Legal Crisis Threatens Managed Care, Best’s Review Life/Health 37
(October 1995).
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divergent rulings often suggest a lack of appreciation of the nature of this
form of insurance and the incidence of costs. There is a legitimate concern
that liability may undermine the potential for managed care to improve ef-
ficiency in the provision of insured health care.
A major thesis of this article is that the growth of managed care liability
exposes the fundamental flaws in traditional rules of liability for medical
malpractice. The traditional, custom-based standard of care has no basis in
efficiency. On the contrary, it gives legitimacy to the standard of care that
developed under traditional indemnity insurance. Customary care under tra-
ditional insurance reflects severe moral hazard and hence overuse of costly
services. The controls and financial incentives of managed care provide a
potentially efficiency-improving (albeit still imperfect) solution to these
problems of moral hazard and the underlying asymmetric information that
undermine efficiency in health insurance markets.
Rules of liability applied to managed care will be fatally flawed unless
courts understand these and other basic features of insurance and health
care markets. Courts must recognize that insurance creates an intrinsic con-
flict between the insured patient’s preferences ex ante, when he or she se-
lects a health plan and pays the premium, and those preferences ex post,
when illness strikes and care appears to be virtually free, because of insur-
ance coverage. An alternative view of this ex ante versus ex post tension is
the conflict between the individual interest of the patient who wants care
and the interest of insured consumers as a group, all of whom face some
probability of falling ill and who collectively bear the cost of the care
through higher premium payments. Because traditional indemnity insurance
encouraged severe moral hazard, the standards of care that developed more
closely reflected the ex post preferences of individual patients. However,
efficient standards of care should reflect ex ante preferences or, equiva-
lently, the average preferences of insureds as a group.
A second misperception that undermines the adoption of sound liability
rules for medical malpractice is the fiction that employers pay for employer-
sponsored insurance. On the contrary, economic theory and evidence indi-
cate that, at least as a first approximation, employees ultimately bear the
costs of employer-sponsored plans—including the costs of liability—
through lower wages or higher premium contributions. In making hiring de-
cisions, employers are concerned with the total labor compensation cost;
the division between wages, health care, and other fringe benefits is de-
signed to meet the preferences of employees. Most employees are willing
to trade some cash wages for health benefits because of the tax and other
advantages of obtaining insurance through employment rather than purchas-
ing it individually. The implication is that the level and structure of health
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benefits reflect employee preferences. Employers are largely intermedi-
aries.2
The fiction that employers pay for health insurance fosters the further
misperception that managed care controls reflect the cost-cutting incentives
of employers against the interests of their employees. These mistaken be-
liefs obscure the interests of employees/consumers in the enforcement of
managed care restrictions. The growing market share of managed care
plans, at the expense of traditional indemnity insurance, implies that em-
ployees are willing to accept some restrictions on choice in return for the
lower premium, the lower copayment, or more comprehensive coverage of-
fered by managed care plans.
Once coverage restrictions of managed care are understood as contractual
terms that employees choose in return for lower premiums, the implication
is that coverage disputes should be handled as contractual disputes. Where
contracts are ambiguous, appropriate coverage should be determined using
a cost-benefit criterion based on beneficiaries’ willingness-to-pay. Specifi-
cally, the court should attempt to determine what coverage and implied cost
these insured consumers would want ex ante, when faced with the choice
and the bill. For publicly funded plans, the analogous question should take
into account willingness-to-pay of taxpayers as well as beneficiaries.
In this article, Section II reviews the implications of asymmetric informa-
tion and insurance in health care markets. Section III describes the struc-
tural change in health care insurance and delivery systems as a potentially
efficient response to these problems of asymmetric information and moral
hazard. Section IV examines the implications of these structural changes for
appropriate liability rules, including proposals for enterprise liability and
termination of the Employer Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-
emption. Section V concludes.
II. Characteristics of Health Care Markets
The design of appropriate liability rules for medical care, including man-
aged care organizations, must recognize the fundamental role of asymmet-
ric information and insurance in health care markets.
A. Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information between buyers and sellers is the basis for pro-
fessional liability in general and medical malpractice in particular. In gen-
eral, the physician knows more than the patient about the best treatment
2 Employers may bear health costs to the extent that actual costs exceed the level expected
in employment contracts.
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for the patient’s condition and the quality of care actually delivered. This
information asymmetry implies that providers appropriately play a key role
as agents to guide patients in their use of medical services. However, these
same agents/advisors often themselves implement, and therefore have a fi-
nancial stake in, the recommended course of treatment. If consumers lack
good information to evaluate quality, competitive markets may fail to pro-
vide the optimal level and mix of qualities.3 However, market participants
may themselves have incentives to provide information, such as quality rat-
ing systems, and to develop contractual forms and other mechanisms for
reducing the potential inefficiencies that result from imperfect information.
The managed care revolution may be viewed as one stage in the evolution
of health care markets toward more efficient forms of insurance contract,
provider reimbursement, and organizational structure, in order to make pro-
viders better agents.
In markets that are subject to imperfect information, a negligence rule of
liability is one potential corrective device, assuming that courts know and
can costlessly enforce the efficient standard of care. However, if courts lack
perfect information, then the effect of a systematically biased rule or even
a rule that is unbiased on average but unpredictable can be perverse.4
B. Insurance and Moral Hazard
The second distinguishing feature of health care markets is the pervasive
role of insurance. The percentage of total health expenditures that was paid
out-of-pocket fell from 56 percent in 1960 to 23 percent in 1990, reflecting
the growth in employer-provided health insurance benefits and the expan-
sion of Medicare and Medicaid programs. The percent paid out-of-pocket
ranges from under 10 percent for inpatient hospital care to 50 percent or
more for services such as outpatient drugs and vision care.5
The obvious advantage of insurance is that it protects consumers from
the financial risk of medical expense and makes care affordable that would
otherwise not be. The disadvantage is that this financial protection makes
consumers indifferent to the cost of the care, leading to the use of a greater
3 See, for example, Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure, and
Product Liability, 64 Rev Econ Stud 561 (1977); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability vs. Negli-
gence, 9 J Legal Stud 1 (1980).
4 John Calfee and Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Le-
gal Standards, 70 Va L Rev 965 (1986); Patricia M. Danzon, Liability and Liability Insur-
ance for Medical Malpractice, 4 J Health Econ 309 (1985).
5 Since employer contributions to employee health insurance are not taxable income to
employees, employer contributions are implicitly subsidized at the employee’s marginal tax
rate, including federal and state taxes on income and payroll. This subsidy has led to more
comprehensive coverage and less copayment than would occur without this tax distortion.
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Figure 1.—Effect of insurance on utilization of health services
volume of services and/or higher cost services than consumers would
choose if they faced the full cost. This is illustrated in Figure 1, in which
the demand for medical services D assumes that consumers have unbiased
expectations of benefits of care. Services are assumed to be competitively
supplied at a price equal to the constant marginal cost.6 The socially optimal
quantity is Q*, which is also the private optimum chosen by the consumer
if faced with the full price. With full insurance (zero copayment), the pa-
tient prefers Q0. If physicians are paid fee-for-service, they have every in-
centive—as good agents for their patients and in their own financial inter-
ests—to recommend and provide all services that offer an expected benefit
to the patient at least equal to the patient’s copayment, in this case Q0.
The difference between the insurance-induced increase in cost Q*CBQ0
and the value of the additional care received Q*CQ0 is an insurance-in-
duced excess burden or deadweight loss. This excess burden reduces the
value of insurance to consumers who ultimately pay the full premium
OABQ0 either directly or as a wage offset for employer-provided insurance.
If premiums are actuarially fair—just adequate to cover the full cost of in-
sured services to the insurer—consumers correctly perceive that premiums
6 Changing these assumptions to include imperfect information and imperfectly competi-
tive supply would complicate the measurement of deadweight loss but not change the main
point. See Mark Pauly, Comment, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58(3) Am Econ Rev
531 (1968). See also Martin Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J
Pol Econ 251 (March 1973).
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are excessive relative to the value that they place on covered services. But
each consumer faces a prisoner’s dilemma: the dominant strategy for the
individual is excessive consumption, correctly reasoning that costs are
borne largely by other insureds and that they will do the same.7 A similar
incentive to ignore costs applies to the choice of quality of service. Hereaf-
ter ‘‘moral hazard’’ refers to insurance-induced overuse of quantity or qual-
ity of services.
Because moral hazard undermines the value of insurance to consumers,
insurers in competitive markets attempt to compete by devising new strat-
egies for controlling moral hazard in ways that are least objectionable to
consumers. Traditional indemnity insurance relied almost exclusively on
various forms of copayment. But because copayment reduces financial pro-
tection, insurance contracts optimally include a limit or stop-loss on the
consumer’s exposure to copayments. In the case of health insurance, most
patients who have a significant episode of care, such as a hospitalization,
incur sufficiently high expense to exceed their stop-loss. Thus the evidence
from actual contracts indicates that optimal limits on copayment are such
that most patients face a zero marginal price for most inpatient care and
other high cost procedures. Optimal copayment levels for low income per-
sons are also generally too low to be effective in controlling overuse.8
III. The Managed Care Revolution
The rising cost of health insurance premiums has led consumers9 to de-
mand—and insurers to offer—alternative strategies to control overuse. Tra-
ditional indemnity insurance, with fee-for-service reimbursement of provid-
ers, relied solely on patient copayment to constrain moral hazard. Managed
7 In theory, moral hazard can be deterred through experience rating. Accurate experience
rating requires a long-term contract in which the insurer can accurately distinguish between
the care that is optimal, given exogenous shocks to health, and overuse due to moral hazard.
In health insurance, experience rating is usually at the level of the group, not the individual,
plausibly because insurers lack the necessary information to apply individual experience rat-
ing without exposing individuals to the risk of being unfairly rated.
8 Although actual copayment levels may be less than would be optimal in the absence of
tax subsidies, similar conclusions emerge from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. That
experiment imposed a cap on cost sharing at 5, 10, or 15 percent of family income. In prac-
tice, virtually everyone who was hospitalized exceeded the cap, such that for marginal
choices all care was free. Willard G. Manning et al, Health Insurance and the Demand for
Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 Am Econ Rev 251 (1986).
9
‘‘Consumers’’ refers here to individual consumers who ultimately pay and to employers
and public entities that act as intermediaries to arrange insurance on behalf of final con-
sumers.
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care plans have developed a range of direct controls and provider incentives
to control overuse while offering consumers lower copayments.
A. Managed Care Strategies
1. Direct Controls and Information-Based Rules
The most common restriction is utilization review (UR), which requires
prior authorization of expensive services by the insurer before a service is
reimbursed. More recent developments include treatment protocols and
practice guidelines that outline approved treatment plans for particular med-
ical conditions. Failure to adhere to these guidelines may result in the denial
of reimbursement for the patient and/or some requirement on the provider
to justify deviation. Importantly, UR limits only the reimbursement by the
plan, not the actual use of services by the patient. In practice, however, in-
surance coverage may be necessary for the patient to afford high cost care.
2. Selected Provider Networks
Managed care plans typically restrict coverage to a network of ‘‘pre-
ferred providers,’’ who agree to accept lower fees and/or assume financial
risk in return for the higher volume that results from participation in the
network. In traditional HMOs and preferred provider organizations (PPOs),
patients must pay in full for out-of-network use. More recently, point-of-
service plans provide partial coverage but require higher copayment for use
of out-of-network providers.
3. Provider Risk Sharing
A third basic managed care strategy is to shift from passive payment of
providers, based on fee-for-service or costs incurred, to various forms of
fixed fee payment for a comprehensive episode or period of care, regardless
of the volume or cost of services actually delivered. Primary care physi-
cians in HMOs commonly receive a capitation payment per enrolled patient
per month, to cover all primary care services. Primary care physicians also
frequently act as gatekeepers, whose referral is required before a patient can
be reimbursed for specialty care. Some plans use separate capitation pay-
ments for referrals to specialists, ancillary services, or pharmaceuticals. For
hospital care, HMOs generally pay negotiated rates per diem or per case,
which puts the hospital at risk for services per day or per admission, com-
bined with penalties for high volume.
Capitation forms of reimbursement reverse provider incentives, com-
pared to fee-for-service. When the provider is paid a fixed amount per pa-
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tient or episode, ordering extra services or tests entails additional costs but
generates no additional revenue.10 Both theory and evidence indicate that
managed care strategies reduce utilization and expenditures, particularly for
inpatient care, relative to unconstrained fee-for-service.11
Under certain conditions, capitation could lead to provision of the opti-
mal level of care (Q* in Figure 1). A sufficient condition is that patients
are reasonably well informed about the expected health outcomes delivered
by different providers before they select their plan and provider. With good
information about outcomes, providers would have incentives to make opti-
mal choices for care, in which case liability would be unnecessary.
However, with imperfect monitoring of outcomes, the capitated provider
may have incentives to provide too little care. In that case, liability may be
a potentially useful corrective device, ceteris paribus.12
B. Efficiency Gains of Integrated Networks
Expanding the scope of services for which providers can efficiently as-
sume capitation is a major motivation for the current consolidation and for-
mation of networks. Integrated delivery systems (IDSs) offer potential effi-
ciency gains in the bearing of risk, more cost-effective substitution among
services, economies of scale and scope, and monitoring of quality. The net
effect is likely to be a reduction in the need for liability.
10 With discounted fee-for-service, as in PPOs, the physician still has incentives to in-
crease revenue by performing additional services. However, PPOs usually combine fee-for-
service payment with monitoring and strict criteria for excluding high cost providers from
the network.
11 For evidence on UR, see Paul Feldstein et al, The Effects of UR Programs on Health
Care Use and Expenditure, 318 New Eng J Medicine 1310 (1987). For evidence on effects
of HMOs, see Manning et al (cited in note 8). In 1994, inpatient days per thousand insured
lives ranged across communities nationwide from 279 to 380, or over 25 percent, with almost
a 50 percent spread in premiums per member per month, from $125 to $297. By contrast the
spread across the seven largest plans in Los Angeles was from 175 to 286 inpatient days,
with monthly premiums ranging from $100 to $119. Jacques J. Sokolov, MD, Accountable
Health Plans, Advanced Integrated Delivery Systems and Optimal Physician Organizations:
Understanding What to Do and Why (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Bar Foundation, New Orleans, August 1994).
12 The effect of alternative liability rules on levels of care and hence on patient utility,
under capitation or fee-for-service reimbursement, is analyzed in Patricia M. Danzon, Alter-
native Liability Regimes for Medical Injuries: Evidence from Simulation Analysis, 61 J
Risk & Insurance 219 (1994). Under reasonable assumptions, the gains in the patient’s utility
from provider liability are greater when providers are capitated than with fee-for-service, be-
cause of the incentives for underprovision with capitation. However, this model ignores the
improvements in market monitoring that are actually occurring with capitation forms of reim-
bursement.
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1. Risk-Bearing Advantages of Networks
Larger, more diversified networks permit more efficient bearing of exog-
enous risk, that is, the risk related to the frequency and severity of exoge-
nous shocks to health of the insured population, which are beyond human
control, at least in the short run. Pooling this exogenous risk is the essential
function of traditional insurance. But this exogenous risk is partially shifted
to providers, as insurers adopt capitation forms of payment as a device to
control the endogenous, moral hazard ‘‘risk.’’ Under full capitation, a pro-
vider becomes de facto the insurer. The moral hazard ‘‘risk’’ is most effi-
ciently borne by the individual physician, for whom it is not a risk but a
controllable cost. But the individual physician has insufficient diversifica-
tion to be an efficient bearer of the uncontrollable, exogenous risk. An indi-
vidual or small group practice could purchase reinsurance or shift risk to
some other risk-bearing entity, such as an HMO, but this dilutes the incen-
tives for moral hazard control. By contrast, a capitated network that spans
a large volume of patients and a comprehensive range of services is more
diversified and hence able to bear the exogenous risk. Thus, given the po-
tential efficiency gains from provider risk assumption for purposes of moral
hazard control, the formation of larger provider groups becomes efficient in
order to diversify the exogenous population health risks.
The capitated provider networks would ideally span a sufficiently broad
range of services and providers to meet consumers’ demand for choice and
comprehensive care, while at the same time providing good diversification
of exogenous risks. But the larger the provider network, the greater the in-
centive for each provider to ‘‘shirk’’ on controlling moral hazard, since
each individual’s utilization has a negligible effect on the performance of
the group as a whole. Thus, the optimal size and structure of networks and
the optimal risk-sharing and management strategies for effective control
within large networks are complex, requiring trade-off on many dimen-
sions. The current heterogeneous mix of network structure and risk-sharing
arrangements reflects the trial and error that is a necessary stage in learning
the most efficient management and risk-sharing arrangements.
2. Efficient Substitution among Services
Under traditional fee-for-service insurance, the separate reimbursement
of individual hospitals and physicians creates incentives for duplication.
Simple capitation of primary care physicians, as in traditional HMOs, cre-
ates incentives for excessive referrals to specialists and inefficient substitu-
tion of other services that are excluded from the primary care capitation.
This incentive to overrefer can be countered by expanding the gatekeeper’s
capitation to include partial risk sharing for other services. However, this
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in turn may entail unacceptable financial exposure and require that the pri-
mary care physician become a manager or purchaser of other services,
which may not be to his or her comparative advantage.
The integrated provider network that assumes a comprehensive capitation
payment to cover the full range of medical services has incentives to substi-
tute efficiently between all medical resources—for example, primary or
specialist care, home care or inpatient care, drug therapy or surgery. For the
purchaser, this yields either lower cost for the desired quality of care or
greater value for a given cost. Distortions such as excessive specialty refer-
rals by primary care physicians are eliminated.
3. Network Advantages in Competing on Quality
The integrated network has a competitive advantage, for both statistical
and economic reasons, in responding to consumers’ demands for competi-
tion on quality and outcomes. The outcome for an individual patient or indi-
vidual physician lacks statistical credibility; that is, the effect of the individ-
ual provider’s actions cannot be distinguished from other random factors
that affect outcomes in small samples. The low signal to noise ratio under-
mines accurate outcomes measurement for all but the largest hospitals.
Moreover, since patient care optimally requires input from many individual
providers and institutions, measuring outcomes for each provider individu-
ally raises problems of distinguishing marginal contributions.
By contrast, the average outcomes experience for a comprehensive net-
work for a large patient population provides a more credible statistical mea-
sure of quality. With a network, the problem of monitoring individual pro-
viders becomes a problem for internal management, not the purchaser. The
integrated network thus has a competitive advantage in competing on the
basis of quality and cost, assuming that managers are better informed than
purchasers.
4. Economies of Scale and Scope
Comprehensive networks can take advantage of economies of scale and
scope in several areas. First, the information systems, expertise, and other
human capital required for managing costs and quality can be shared. Sec-
ond, since managed care has reduced the demand for inpatient and special-
ist care, efficient scale may require rationalization across hospitals—for ex-
ample, unit costs can be reduced by concentrating cardiac care in one
facility, while another does obstetrics. Quality is also enhanced, since facili-
ties that perform higher volumes of complex procedures generally have bet-
ter outcomes.
Third, networks that provide a comprehensive range of medical services
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offer transactions cost savings to purchasers, including self-insured employ-
ers, HMOs, Medicaid agencies, and others. Multistate employers with em-
ployees in diverse geographic areas seek the transaction cost savings of
contracting with a single insurer or provider network that can serve all em-
ployees, regardless of location. Traditional HMOs have had limited geo-
graphic coverage tied to their local network of contracted providers. The
current merger wave has produced alliances between such provider net-
works in different geographic markets in order to offer economies in con-
tracting costs for services that span broadly defined product and geographic
markets.
C. Control and Residual Risk Bearing in Networks
Organizational forms and allocation of risk and control within health care
institutions are in flux. Any MCO includes an insurance component, multi-
ple hospitals, and physicians organized individually or in groups. The shar-
ing of control and risk between these components varies, reflecting complex
explicit and implicit contracts. If the residual risk bearer is other than a tra-
ditional insurer or HMO, then it may have to meet licensure requirements
as an insurer under state regulation, although the law on this point is in flux.
The underlying trend is that providers, through more or less loosely inte-
grated systems, are bearing an increasing share of the financial risk, taking
capitation for an increasingly broad range of services. Some IDSs contract
directly with self-insured employers, using a traditional insurance interme-
diary only for claims administration. Others contract with existing HMOs
that in turn contract with employers and public payers. The role of the
HMO may include some benefit design, claims handling and administration,
and acting as the insurance entity for compliance with state regulatory re-
quirements for solvency, rate filing, and so forth.
Health plans differ not only in organizational form but also in the ser-
vices covered, premium and copayment structure, incentives and controls
on providers, use of third party review organizations, and so forth. For pa-
tients, this implies variation in out-of-pocket exposure, time and hassle
costs of dealing with UR and gatekeepers, restrictions on choice of provid-
ers, and limits on covered services. Market equilibrium in theory entails a
matching of consumers to plans, based on consumer preferences for these
different coverage dimensions.
Employers play a significant role as intermediaries in health insurance
markets, since roughly 80 percent of private insurance is obtained through
employment. The role of employers may be limited to contracting with in-
surers or HMOs for off-the-shelf plans that bear full risk. Increasingly,
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however, medium- and large-size employers self-insure at least part of the
financial risk, and some negotiate plans that are specifically tailored to their
workforce. This role of employers has raised issues of liability, particularly
related to the preemption of state laws for employer-sponsored plans under
ERISA.
If managed care does offer significant efficiency gains, as argued here,
an obvious question is, why have these changes not occurred sooner?
Among the many contributing factors, two seem particularly important to
current trends. First, advances in information technology have made feasi-
ble the operation of large networks at reasonable cost. The electronic pa-
tient record that can instantaneously coordinate and disseminate all avail-
able information about a patient’s history, prior tests, treatments, and
medications to all relevant providers and to the billing department is now
close to a reality in some systems. Improved information flows should per-
mit significant efficiency gains from eliminating duplication and more effi-
cient coordination of care.
The second major stimulus to managed care is the continued increase in
absolute cost of health care. Rising health costs are driven largely by tech-
nological advances. However, traditional insurance lacks both principles
and mechanisms for technology assessment as a precondition of coverage.
Standard contracts promise coverage of all ‘‘medically necessary’’ care,
with the exclusion of ‘‘experimental procedures’’ and possibly certain
broadly defined services such as chiropractic or physiotherapy.13
These criteria in fact defer coverage decisions to physicians. Under tradi-
tional insurance, physicians have financial and professional incentives to
provide all services that offer any expected benefit to the patient. But the
continual development of cost-increasing but quality-enhancing technolo-
gies is forcing private and public payers to confront the politically and tech-
nically difficult issues of deciding what services insurance should cover.
Managed care is a step in that direction. Although managed care plans still
typically retain the promise to cover all ‘‘medically necessary care,’’ mak-
ing that determination is no longer left to the treating physician. Informa-
tion-based tools of technology assessment, including cost-effectiveness and
cost-benefit analysis, are increasingly used.14
13 For detailed discussion of the content of actual health insurance contracts and proposals
for greater specificity, see Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care Choices: Private Contracts as
Instruments of Health Reform (1995).
14 Anne Elixhauser, Bryan R. Luce, and Claudia A. Steiner, Cost Effectiveness Analysis,
Medical Technology Assessment, and Managed Care Organizations (paper presented at the
American Enterprise Institute Conference on Policy Issues in Cost-Effectiveness, Washing-
ton, DC, November 20, 1996).
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IV. Implications for Liability
These characteristics of health care and insurance markets—asymmetric
information and moral hazard under traditional insurance and the resulting
evolution of managed care—have important implications for liability rules.
A. Liability under Traditional Insurance
The traditional liability rule for medical malpractice is negligence, with
due care defined as customary care. As argued above, where care requires
the performance of additional reimbursable procedures, there is a strong
presumption that customary care exceeds the socially optimal level, because
of moral hazard–induced excess under traditional insurance. Thus the stan-
dard presumption that a negligence rule leads to a socially efficient level of
care15 does not apply. It might be argued that if health insurance markets
are competitive, the level of insurance coverage and implied level of care
are second best, subject to imperfect information. However, this presump-
tion does not apply to private or public insurance in the United States. Pri-
vate insurance is distorted by the tax subsidy. The excessive norms under
private insurance are largely adopted by the public insurance programs,
Medicare and Medicaid, which may be further distorted due to the political
process. Thus traditional liability with negligence based on customary care
tends to reinforce insurance-driven overuse of medical services; at best it
may prevent suboptimal precautions per unit of service and significant devi-
ations from expected care. If managed care is to succeed as a mechanism
for reducing the deadweight loss from traditional overuse of medical ser-
vices, then liability rules must recognize the excess embedded in customary
care and must evaluate managed care by standards other than medical
custom.
B. Liability under Managed Care
Claims against health plans fall into two categories—claims for wrongful
denial of access to needed medical treatment, and claims based on quality
of care or provider malpractice.16
1. Claims for Denial of Coverage
In Wickline v. State, Mrs. Wickline sued MediCal (California’s Medicaid
program) for negligence in approving only a 4-day postoperative hospital-
15 Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J Legal Stud 28 (1972); John P. Brown,
Towards a Theory of Liability, 2 J Legal Stud 323 (1973); Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for
Medical Malpractice, 3 J Econ Perspectives 51 (1991).
16 See, for example, Robert J. Conrad, Jr., and Patrick D. Seiter, Health Plan Liability in
the Age of Managed Care, 62 Defense Counsel J 191 (1995).
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ization, rather than the 8-day period requested by her physician. Following
discharge, Mrs. Wickline’s condition deteriorated. When she was readmit-
ted 9 days later her leg had to be amputated.
The lower court awarded damages but the California Court of Appeal
reversed, finding that the MediCal restriction was not the cause of her dis-
charge, which was the responsibility of her physician, who had not ap-
pealed the decision. The court also referred to the fact that the discharge
was consistent with the usual standards of medical practice in the commu-
nity, and as a result, MediCal was not culpable of breach of duty.
A very different conclusion was reached in Fox v. HealthNet. In this
case, the HMO denied coverage of a bone marrow transplant for treatment
of Mrs. Fox’s breast cancer, on grounds that it was ‘‘investigational.’’ She
had previously undergone two radical mastectomies and chemotherapy.
One cancer center had evaluated her as an eligible candidate for a bone
marrow transplant, but another center considered her ineligible because the
cancer had metastasized to her bone marrow. Mrs. Fox raised the necessary
funds through a public appeal and had the transplant. She and her husband
sued HealthNet alleging breach of contract, breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Mrs.
Fox died before trial. The jury awarded approximately $89 million, includ-
ing $77 million in punitive damages, finding that the HMO had acted in
bad faith, breached its contract for care, and intentionally inflicted emo-
tional distress through reckless denial of coverage. The jury was allegedly
irritated that the plan provided financial incentives to withhold care. The
case was ultimately settled prior to appeal. However, thereafter, as David
Maslen notes, ‘‘all insurers and HMOs universally make the procedure
available for the treatment of breast cancer.’’17 Note that, unlike Wickline,
Fox did not allege negligence; rather, it relied on contract theories com-
monly used to challenge insurance coverage decisions.
These cases raise two questions. First, what—if any—should be the basis
for liability for denial of coverage of medical treatment, and what is the
appropriate measure of damages? Second, assuming that there is a finding
of liability, who should be liable—the physician, the plan, or the UR com-
pany? Or should joint and several liability apply to any party who contrib-
utes to withholding care?
The question of who should be liable, assuming that liability is to be im-
posed, requires drawing a distinction between the insurance/coverage func-
tion and the care delivery function. The health plan defines the contract for
insurance coverage with the patient and is the ultimate residual claimant for
17 David P. Maslen, Employer Managed Care Liability: Defining and Managing the Risk,
J Compensation Benefits 5 (July/August 1995).
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profit or loss. The plan may share financial risk with providers and contract
with UR agencies for implementation. Nevertheless, the plan as ultimate
insuring entity and residual claimant should bear liability for coverage deci-
sions. This principle applies to an insurer-sponsored MCO, a provider-spon-
sored HMO, or an IDS licensed to act as insurer. In the latter case, the lia-
bility of the provider IDS arises out of its role as insurer and ultimate risk
bearer, not its role in delivering care.
Of course the Coase Theorem implies that where the courts place liability
is largely irrelevant, if transacting is costless. For example, if liability is
placed on physicians, physicians could contract with the plan for either in-
demnification of damages or reimbursement high enough to cover the ex-
pected costs of liability.18 Similarly, if liability is placed on a UR company,
it could contract with the plan for indemnification. However, placing liabil-
ity on an agent of the plan, such as the physician or the UR agency, could
lead to nonoptimal legal defense effort and added transactions costs of in-
demnification. Minimization of transactions costs therefore requires that lia-
bility be placed directly on the plan as residual claimant and the entity ulti-
mately responsible for coverage decisions.
In Wickline, the court suggested that liability should be placed on the
physician, because the advice of the treating physician is a significant factor
in the plan’s determination of whether to make an exception to a general
coverage rule. Most plans have appeal procedures, in which the physician
may act as the patient’s agent. But if the treating physician is to be poten-
tially liable for denial of care, how is a due care standard for physicians
to be defined? What appeal procedures must they undertake? How much
uncompensated time must the physician spend arguing the patient’s case?
If the claim is denied, does due care require that the physician provide free
services? What about referrals for hospital care?
More formally, consider the definition of a due care standard for effort
by the physician in appealing plan decisions. Efficient investment of physi-
cian time requires that the expected benefit is equal to its marginal cost:
p(B 2 C ) 5 c, (1)
where p is the probability that the plan agrees to provide coverage, B is the
expected marginal benefit of the service to the patient, C is the marginal
cost of the service, and c is the marginal opportunity cost of the physician’s
18 For a similar analysis in the context of enterprise liability in general, see Lewis Korn-
hauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice between Enterprise and Personal Liability for
Accidents, 70 Cal L Rev 1345 (1982).
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time. The efficient decision rule is to perform the procedure if the expected
net benefit exceeds the cost:
B 2 C $ c. (2)
Assume that the courts set the damage award A equal to B. If the physi-
cian is liable for damages, his private incentive is to appeal if pA 5 pB .
c, regardless of treatment cost C, assuming that he bears no fraction of C.
Thus, physician liability is likely to lead to excessive appeal whenever p is
reasonably high. On the other hand, the plan’s incentive is to deny coverage
as long as C . 0, assuming that the plan bears none of the liability cost.
Thus the plan faces optimal incentives for coverage decisions only if the
expected social net benefit from treatment B 2 C and the opportunity cost
of reevaluating the decision c are internalized to the plan. This requires that
physicians can costlessly contract for indemnification of damages and time
spent in appeal. It is simpler to place liability directly on the plan, in which
case the plan has incentives to encourage physicians to invest optimally in
appeal and in providing information for making coverage decisions. In con-
clusion, any liability for coverage denial should be placed only on the
health plan as residual claimant, not on providers or UR personnel.19
The more fundamental question is: what, if any, should be the basis for
liability, and what damages are appropriate? The plaintiff in Wickline sued
for negligent denial of coverage. Although the court ruled for the defense,
it left open the possibility that third-party payers could be liable for ‘‘de-
fects in the design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms as,
for example, when appeals made on the patient’s behalf are arbitrarily ig-
nored or unreasonably overridden.’’ The court considered it ‘‘essential that
cost limitation programs not be permitted to corrupt medical judgment.’’20
By suggesting that health plans could be liable for ‘‘defects in the design
of a cost containment mechanism,’’ the court implicitly assumed the exis-
tence of an objective standard for a nondefective cost containment mecha-
nism. The additional allusion to ‘‘corruption of medical judgment’’ sug-
gests that medical judgment should define appropriate medical care and, by
implication, serve as the basis for defining an acceptable cost containment
mechanism. Certainly, this language does not appear to permit the possibil-
ity that medical judgment might define an inappropriate standard of care.
However, the notion that medical science can or should define appro-
19 The issue of employer liability for coverage restrictions in self-insured plans is dis-
cussed below.
20 Wickline v State, 239 Cal Rptr 810 (Cal App 1986), review granted, 727 P2d 753 (Cal
1986), review dismissed, remanded, ordered published in part, 741 P2d 613 (Cal 1987).
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priate care is a fiction. At best, medical science may be able to tell us the
probability distribution of health outcomes and risks from a given treat-
ment.21 To decide whether a particular procedure is worth performing re-
quires comparing the value of the expected health outcomes to costs. Valua-
tion of medical services ultimately depends on consumer preferences for
alternative outcomes, including tolerance for risk and discomfort, prefer-
ences for health care versus other goods, and so forth. Thus ‘‘medical judg-
ment’’ alone cannot provide a basis for evaluating a particular cost contain-
ment mechanism or coverage decision.
A standard based on ‘‘medically necessary’’ care not only lacks sound
theoretical grounding, in practice it is also likely to be biased in the United
States toward excessive use of care because of the moral hazard incentives
of traditional insurance. With fee-for-service insurance plans and low pa-
tient copayments, physicians had incentives to define all care with positive
expected gross benefit (B . 0) as ‘‘medically necessary.’’ However, the
socially optimal standard would define care as appropriate only if the ex-
pected net benefit is positive: B 2 C $ 0. This corresponds to Q* in Figure
1 and is the level consumers would choose ex ante, before decisions are
distorted by moral hazard.
The court in Wickline also referred to custom as a standard of defining
appropriate care, without identifying the norm for customary care. But if
the purpose of managed care is to change the norms of customary care that
prevailed under indemnity insurance, then failure by the courts to recognize
and respect this shift will obstruct the evolution of managed care and pre-
vent the realization of its potential efficiency gains.
The only valid criterion for resolving coverage disputes under managed
care is the contractual terms of the particular plan or, where these terms are
not sufficiently specific, a cost-benefit analysis to determine what coverage
consumers would have been willing to pay for.22 Viewing a coverage dis-
pute as a contract issue, the relevant question is: would consumers have
been willing to pay for insurance coverage of this service, given their ex
ante probability distributions of illness and expected outcomes from treat-
ment, the cost of treatment, and iatrogenic risks? For private health plans,
the relevant measure is the ex ante willingness-to-pay of plan enrollees. For
21 Basing treatment decisions on objective measures of effectiveness or cost effectiveness
is limited in practice because of lack of information about the effectiveness, hence the cost
effectiveness, of most existing technologies and treatments.
22 Broader proposals for treating all medical malpractice claims as claims in contract, not
tort, are discussed in Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 76
Am Bar Found Res J 87 (1976); and Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evi-
dence and Public Policy (1985). See also Havighurst (cited in note 13).
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tax-financed plans such as Medicare and Medicaid, the relevant willing-
ness-to-pay is the summation of willingness-to-pay of beneficiaries and of
taxpayers. This assumes that taxpayers derive some benefit, possibly includ-
ing altruism, peace of mind, or protection against contagious diseases, from
subsidizing health care for the poor and elderly.
Inevitably, an ex ante willingness-to-pay standard will appear to conflict
with the interests of the individual insured patient once sick, who would
then want to have coverage of all services that offer any expected positive
benefit. However, to achieve an efficient standard of liability for coverage
disputes, courts must ignore the ex post or patient-specific private optimum
and focus on the ex ante or group optimum, which also approximates the
social optimum.
In the managed care marketplace, if plans compete on price, choice, and
quality, they have incentives to cover services that yield expected health
benefits that are worth their cost to consumers. Patients who want compre-
hensive coverage can choose high premium plans. If patients who select
low coverage plans are permitted to sue whenever the restrictions on cover-
age come into effect, in the long run lower cost, lower coverage plans will
not break even, and consumers will be denied the option of selecting such
plans.23
The risk that liability will deprive consumers of the option of choosing
lower cost, lower quality products is familiar from the context of product
liability and will not be repeated here.24 However, it is worth noting that
this risk and the resulting deadweight losses are likely to be particularly
great in the context of health plans for several reasons. First, the political
process seems to require adherence to the view that there should be a single
level of health care for all, despite the strong evidence that individuals make
different decisions for their own coverage and that taxpayers are not willing
to pay the subsidies necessary to finance the same level of care for the poor
as they want for themselves. Second, because employers and insurers act
as financial intermediaries between patients and medical care providers, it
is easy to exploit the fiction that restrictions are imposed by uncaring,
profit-seeking third parties, rather than resulting from the voluntary choices
of consumers who choose lower cost health plans in return for higher cash
wages. Third, in the case of public programs, courts may attempt to require
more comprehensive coverage than taxpayers are willing to finance for the
poor and elderly. In that case cuts are likely to be made in other program
23 The recognition by courts of a ‘‘significant minority’’ standard of care is a very inade-
quate means to address the fundamental fact that standards of care are heterogeneous.
24 Walter Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 Bell J Econ 3 (1973).
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dimensions, through the political process, to bring expenditures more in line
with the expenditure levels desired by taxpayers.25
If coverage disputes are to be resolved as cases of contract, the appro-
priate remedy is specific performance; that is, the plan is required to pay
for the service. If the service is no longer appropriate, the plan should reim-
burse the patient for costs incurred due to breach, including economic and
noneconomic loss.
A remaining question is whether awarding punitive damages, as in Fox
and several other recent cases, is appropriate. In theory, punitive damages
could serve a useful deterrent function if consumers systematically under-
report valid claims, such that plans face suboptimal incentives to adhere to
contract terms. In practice, there is no evidence that such underclaiming is
common. Moreover, this theoretical result presupposes that liability is the
only corrective mechanism, as in injuries to strangers. In the case of medi-
cal injuries, regulation and market forces also play a role. Private and public
payers increasingly demand that plans report a range of measures of health
outcomes and consumer satisfaction. Moreover, employee benefit managers
act as surrogates in monitoring plans for consumers. Thus the ability of the
market to penalize plans for reneging on contract terms is growing. To the
extent that market policing is effective, liability and a fortiori punitive dam-
ages are unnecessary.
Moreover, any potential deterrence benefits of punitive damages must
offset the potential costs in terms of excessive levels of care. Even if legal
standards and rules of damages are unbiased for efficient levels on average,
uncertainty about the standards can lead providers to adopt excessive levels
of care.26 This incentive arises if excessive care reduces the probability of
being found liable. The tendency for excessive care is exacerbated if the
size of awards, including punitive damages, is excessive and if providers
are risk averse. Risk aversion seems a reasonable assumption, given the
negative reputation effects of a widely publicized adverse ruling against a
health plan.
If punitive damages are to be permitted for denial of coverage, then the
contractual arrangements between the health plan, the physicians, and UR
personnel should not be admissible evidence. In Fox the jury was allegedly
influenced by the fact that the claims reviewer’s financial compensation was
linked to the denial of claims.27 Extending this argument to its logical con-
25 Lower reimbursement for providers is the most common means of cutting costs. Al-
though providers typically adjust by reducing some dimension of quality of service, such as
time spent per patient, the resulting hidden costs are apparently more politically acceptable
than explicit cuts in coverage.
26 Calfee and Craswell (cited in note 4).
27 Graber (cited in note 1).
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clusion, all forms of capitation could be viewed as rewarding providers for
withholding care. This implies that any plan that uses capitation or other
risk-sharing reimbursement, to constrain moral hazard below the level that
prevails in indemnity plans, could be held liable with punitive damages. But
both theory and market evidence suggest that such incentive-based con-
tracts may be efficient contracts to constrain moral hazard. The fact that
consumers increasingly select plans that employ capitation and UR controls
indicates that consumers are willing to accept such techniques for control-
ling overuse of insured services, in preference to either higher premiums or
higher copayments.
If the incentive-based contracts used by managed care are admissible evi-
dence in court, then courts have an obligation to explain to juries the mar-
ket-based rationale for such contracts, including the problems of moral haz-
ard and deadweight loss, the disadvantages of copayments to control moral
hazard, the conflicting interests of the individual patient when sick and their
preferences ex ante when contracting for the coverage, and the incidence of
insurance costs on consumers, not employers. If courts and juries fail to
understand these essential realities of insurance markets, liability will ob-
struct the potential efficiency gains from managed care and, in the long run,
significantly add to the costs of medical care. The risk that liability ob-
structs the efficient evolution of managed care is greater, if punitive dam-
ages are permitted and if evidence on incentive based contracts are admissi-
ble evidence in coverage denial cases.
This principle that coverage disputes should be decided as contractual
disputes, with the default rule being willingness-to-pay, applies equally to
HMOs, managed indemnity plans that operate UR programs, and unman-
aged indemnity plans. The same principles apply, because all plans must
define limits on covered services. However, the conclusions reached may
differ because plans offer different benefits, charge different premiums, and
appeal to different types of consumer. Consumers self-select to different
types of health plan, based on their preferences for cost, coverage, copay-
ment, prompt access to new technologies, restrictions on choice, and so
forth. Thus consumers’ choices among health plans reflect their preferences
and willingness-to-pay, and they should be held to those choices. Similarly,
each type of plan should be held to the coverage as implicitly or explicitly
defined in its contract.
2. Claims Based on Quality of Care
Health plans may be liable for claims related to the quality of care, under
theories of direct corporate negligence, vicarious liability, and ostensible
agency. All such claims also require negligence on the part of a physician.
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Liability for Negligent Credentialing. Theories of direct corporate lia-
bility for negligent credentialing extend to health plans the theories that
have been applied to hold hospitals responsible for credentialing staff phy-
sicians, including physicians who are independent contractors with admit-
ting privileges at the hospital.
Some useful deterrent value may be served by requiring that managed
care plans that restrict coverage to a selected provider network should ad-
here to a standard of care in credentialing their providers. As argued earlier,
cost and quality of care may be more effectively measured at the system
level than at the level of the individual provider. When consumers choose
a managed care plan, they rely to some extent on the plan for basic certifi-
cation of the providers who participate in the plan’s network. If consumers
could perfectly evaluate quality at the plan level, then plans would face ap-
propriate incentives for provider selection and liability for credentialing
would not be necessary. As long as quality measurement is imperfect, lia-
bility for negligent credentialing may serve some useful deterrent function,
assuming that a reasonable standard of care can be defined.28
In practice, standards of care for credentialing are largely process-
based—for example, a hospital or plan must check a physician’s previous
malpractice history before granting privileges. Such measures are imper-
fect, to the extent that the malpractice system commits both type I and type
II errors.29 Nevertheless, provided that process measures are interpreted in
light of the individual physician’s actual exposure, including volume and
type of patients treated, location, and medical specialty, process measures
are probably the best available.
In the case of an IDS that contracts with an MCO, the question arises
whether liability for negligent credentialing should be placed on the IDS or
the MCO. As argued earlier, one motive for providers to form an IDS is to
take fully capitated contracts, competing on cost and quality. If an MCO
that contracts with an IDS has imperfect information about the quality of
the system’s individual providers, then holding the IDS to a standard of
care in selecting participating providers may serve a useful deterrent func-
tion. The IDS is likely to have lower costs in credentialing individual pro-
viders than the MCO. Thus placing liability on the MCO would likely result
in reassignment through indemnification contacts, adding transactions costs.
28 Market failure is most likely to occur when a plan has financial difficulties, such that
go-for-broke behavior becomes an optimal strategy. In such circumstances, the plan is likely
to be judgment proof, in which case liability is also likely to be ineffectual.
29 See, for example, Danzon (cited in note 22 and 15); Frank Sloan et al, Medical Mal-
practice Experience of Physicians: Predictable or Haphazard? 262, No 23 JAMA 3291
(1989); Paul C. Weiler et al, A Measure of Malpractice Medical Injury, Malpractice Litiga-
tion and Patient Compensation (1993).
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In particular, if liability is placed on the MCO, which in turn has a full
indemnification agreement with the IDS, the MCO has less incentive to
monitor legal defense expense and payout of damages than if all these costs
are internalized. The indemnification agreement would likely permit the
IDS to assume responsibility for defense of the claim, but in that case liabil-
ity should be placed directly on the IDS. Since credentialing ultimately only
makes sense at the level of the individual provider, efficient deterrence,
claim defense, and transactions costs argue for placing liability directly on
the IDS, rather than on the MCO.
No additional value would arise from holding the MCO to a duty of care
in credentialing the IDS as a whole. Any reasonable standard of care for a
system depends on its provider mix, so the standard for the system would
reduce to standards for its member providers. For example, a relatively high
frequency of claims against a system that includes a high proportion of sur-
geons and tertiary care hospitals could indicate high quality care and spe-
cialization as a referral center for difficult cases, rather than low quality
care.
Vicarious Liability and Ostensible Agency. A separate issue is whether
an MCO should be liable, under theories of vicarious liability or ostensible
agency, for the negligence of its independent contractor physicians, assum-
ing that the MCO has exercised due care in credentialing.
In Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court reversed a lower court’s summary judgment against the plaintiff, ar-
guing that the HMO could be held liable under a theory of ostensible
agency, if (1) the plaintiff looked to the HMO, not just to the physician, for
care and (2) the HMO ‘‘holds out’’ the physician as its employee. The
HMO’s promotional materials were the major source for making this find-
ing of fact. The promotional brochure described the HMO as a ‘‘total care
program’’ that ‘‘provides medical care’’ as an ‘‘entire health system.’’
Such phrases reflect the attempt by an HMO to distinguish its coverage
from traditional indemnity plans and, specifically, to convey the notions
that coverage is restricted to selected providers, that there may be greater
coordination of care between these providers, and (usually) that financial
coverage is more comprehensive. While these functions make it appropriate
that HMOs be held liable for negligent credentialing, the case for direct lia-
bility for negligence of affiliated providers is much weaker.
In the case of a staff model HMO, in which physicians are salaried em-
ployees who work exclusively for the HMO and are subject to direct and
indirect controls by the HMO, liability may be appropriately placed on the
HMO. In fact, some staff model HMOs and hospitals that employ salaried
physicians already contract to assume the liability of their employees. Such
contractual shifting of liability appears to occur only where the physicians
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exclusively treat patients covered by the plan (or being treated at a single
hospital) and where the close physical proximity enables the institution to
monitor and control the physicians.
However, in the case of independent practice associations (IPAs), PPOs,
point-of-service plans, and IDSs, the contractual relationships between the
plan and the physicians fall far short of control over delivery of care. The
relationship is primarily a financial one, in which the plan acts as an
insurance/reimbursement intermediary for the physicians, including finan-
cial incentives for control of volume of services but not care per unit. The
physician is better placed to evaluate and provide appropriate care per unit
of service, conditional on the coverage decisions for which the plan should
be contractually liable, as discussed above.
Making the plan potentially liable for the negligence of the physician is
unlikely to improve efficient deterrence and may actually reduce efficiency.
Adding another, deeper pocket defendant increases the plaintiff ’s incentives
to invest excessively in litigation and raises costs of coordinating the de-
fense, which in turn is likely to lead to higher litigation costs, more frequent
false positive findings of liability, and excessive damage awards. Thus, add-
ing plans as potential defendants may in fact change outcomes, in which
case the allocation of liability is not an irrelevant detail that can be rectified
through contract. If imposing liability on plans in fact increases defense
costs and/or false positive findings of liability, then plans will seek greater
control over providers, in order to reduce their liability costs. Such control
will reduce the range of options available to consumers and is likely to re-
duce efficiency in the delivery of health services.
The only possible rationale for holding the plan, as well as the physician,
liable for physician negligence is to provide compensation in cases where
the award exceeds the physician’s liability insurance and attachable assets.
But if inadequate compensation is a concern, then the focus should be on
other areas of personal injury litigation, particularly automobile injuries, be-
cause physicians typically carry higher limits of liability insurance and have
greater personal wealth than most other individual defendants. There is no
obvious equity rationale for singling out victims of medical injuries for spe-
cial compensation. However, if this is a social goal, it can be achieved at
lower cost through social insurance systems rather than through distortions
of the liability system.
C. Enterprise Liability
Proposals for enterprise liability call for shifting liability entirely from
individual physicians to larger enterprises, either health plans or hospitals,
rather than simply adding these institutions as potential additional defen-
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dants under theories of vicarious and agency liability. Paul C. Weiler30 and
Kenneth S. Abraham and Weiler31 argue for holding the hospital liable for
all injuries arising out of care of the physicians on their staff, including in-
juries that occur outside the hospital. They argue that this would improve
efficiency of deterrence, because hospitals are best placed to coordinate the
allocation of resources to reduce injuries; provide more accurate internaliza-
tion of costs, because experience rating of liability insurance is more accu-
rate if applied to hospitals than to individual physicians; and reduce the
costs of legal defense.
However, the evidence suggests that liability is already being shifted
through voluntary contract in circumstances where such shifting offers po-
tential efficiency gains, notably staff HMOs and hospitals that employ sala-
ried physicians. The fact that liability is not shifted by voluntary contract
in the majority of managed care plans, physician/hospital arrangements,
and IDSs strongly suggests that to mandate such shifting would reduce ef-
ficiency. This is plausible, because in these circumstances the relationship
is often not exclusive, does not entail close physical proximity, and the plan
or hospital lacks the information necessary to control the care provided by
the physician.
The hospital is particularly inappropriate as a bearer of liability given the
current trend toward shifting care out of the traditional hospital into other
settings. Surgical procedures are increasingly performed in outpatient facili-
ties, recuperative care is shifting to skilled nursing facilities, and so forth.
In an IDS that links primary care group practices, several secondary care
hospitals, and one or more tertiary care hospitals, there is no efficiency ra-
tionale for singling out one of the hospitals as the sole locus of liability
since none is necessarily well placed to control the quality of care in the
others. Moreover, since care often optimally involves multiple ambulatory
and institutional care providers, outcomes and quality are most efficiently
measured at the level of the plan, not the individual hospital.
If liability is shifted from individual providers to the health plans with
which they participate, this is likely to lead to tighter integration, more strict
control by plans over their providers, and exclusive plan-provider arrange-
ments. Exclusive arrangements, whereby each provider participates in only
one plan, would greatly restrict the choice of providers available to patients
who sign up with a particular plan and would increase travel time for con-
sumers. Choice and proximity to providers is a major concern of consumers
in selecting among managed care plans. The current rapid growth in market
30 Weiler et al (cited in note 29).
31 Kenneth S. Abraham and Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution
of the American Health System, 108 Harv L Rev 381 (1994).
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share of point-of-service plans indicates that patients are willing to pay for
more flexibility in their choice of providers than is offered even by the tra-
ditional IPA type of plan, which does not require an exclusive arrangement
between plan and providers. Independent practice associations and, a forti-
ori, point-of-service plans do not fit the enterprise liability model. Thus a
requirement for enterprise liability would likely obstruct the flexibility of
MCOs in developing wider choice options within a managed care environ-
ment.
The argument that enterprise liability would reduce defense costs while
at the same time improving efficiency of deterrence is not convincing. Stan-
dards of care can only meaningfully be defined for providers who ulti-
mately make decisions about the delivery of care. Health plans, by contrast,
as financial intermediaries and residual claimants that define and enforce
coverage decisions, can only meaningfully be held liable in contract for per-
formance of their contractual obligations, as described above.
If plans are held liable for negligence on the part of their participating
providers, a reasonable standard of care must still be applied at the level of
the provider. In that case, the provider will be called to defend the claim,
which undermines potential savings in defense costs. If individual providers
are not called as defendants, then it is likely that the standard for plans will
evolve into a standard of strict liability for any adverse outcome. Although
a strict liability standard can in theory yield efficient incentives for care, the
necessary conditions to achieve this result are unlikely to hold in the case
of medical care because of the difficulty of distinguishing an adverse out-
come of the patient’s underlying illness from an injury caused by medical
care. Thus, the likely evolution of a strict liability scheme for medical inju-
ries is toward a very broad social insurance scheme for all imperfect health
outcomes. The experience of Sweden and New Zealand, which have oper-
ated quasi-no-fault systems for medical injuries, shows that the apparent
savings in litigation cost are achieved by forgoing all attempts at deter-
rence.32 It is unclear what efficiency or equity goals are served by these
schemes.
D. The ERISA Preemption
The ERISA preempts state laws to the extent that they ‘‘relate to’’ an
employee benefit plan subject to ERISA. This preemption generally extends
to HMOs to the extent that HMO coverage is purchased through a health
32 Patricia M. Danzon, The Swedish Patient Compensation System: Myths and Realities,
14 Intl Rev L & Econ 453 (1994); Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform: The Case of Medical
Malpractice, 10 Oxford Rev Econ Papers 84 (1994).
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benefit program sponsored by a private employer.33 However, the exact
reach of the ERISA preemption is uncertain and in flux. So far, most courts
have denied plaintiff claims for money damages related to denial of cover-
age. For example, in Kuhl v. Lincoln National Life Plan, the plaintiff al-
leged claims of medical malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, tortious interference with contract, and breach of contract against
Lincoln National as administrator of plan benefits. The Eighth Circuit Court
held that the plaintiff ’s state law claims were preempted by ERISA and that
ERISA does not authorize recovery of money damages for an administra-
tor’s alleged misconduct. The facts and the allegations in this case are simi-
lar to those in Fox, but the outcomes are dramatically different because the
employer sponsor in Fox was a California school district and, as a public
entity, was not protected by ERISA.
The ERISA preemption is consistent with the contractual nature of em-
ployee benefit plans, with both benefits and costs ultimately borne by em-
ployees. As noted earlier, assuming that employees select jobs on the basis
of the total compensation package offered, the employer has incentives to
offer health plans that maximize the utility of covered employees, since this
minimizes the money wage or other benefits that must be offered to attract
a given workforce.34 This makes clear the absurdity of permitting claims for
denial of coverage, except where violation of contractual commitments can
be shown.
Efficiency and equity argue for eliminating the inconsistencies between
liability exposure of ERISA-protected plans and non-ERISA plans. Under
the status quo, employers have incentives to assume more risk in self-fund-
ing, in order to qualify for the ERISA preemption and hence limit their ex-
pected liability costs,35 even if this results in nonoptimal diversification of
stochastic risk. The ERISA preemption reaches approximately the right
conclusions, but often for the wrong reasons. Unfortunately, current leg-
islative proposals appear more likely to achieve alignment of liability of
ERISA and non-ERISA plans by extending liability for quality of care to
all HMOs.36 For reasons outlined earlier, the preferred approach would be
to hold all health plans liable under contract for denial of coverage consis-
33 Conrad and Seiter (cited in note 16).
34 This incentive of employers to act as good agents for employees may be weaker in the
case of coverage for retirees. However, appropriate incentives are preserved to the extent that
current workers are aware of the coverage for retirees and factor this into their estimates of
the value of the compensation package.
35 The expected liability costs of a non-ERISA plan will be internalized to the employer
through a higher premium.
36 Robert Pear, HMOs Asserting Immunity in Suits over Malpractice, NY Times (Novem-
ber 17, 1996).
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tent with the contract. However, claims for negligent delivery of care
should be permitted only against individual providers, except in the case of
hospitals or staff model HMOs that contractually assume all liability claims
against their employees.
V. Concluding Comments
The trend toward managed care reflects a competitive response to the de-
mand for alternative forms of insurance contract that provide better control
of moral hazard than traditional indemnity insurance. Change in insurance
products, together with technological advance in both medical care and in-
formation systems, is leading to radical change in the scale and structure
of health care enterprises. The volume and variety of consolidations oc-
curring across all segments of the health care sector reflect ongoing experi-
mentation to develop contractual forms that offer better control over cost
and quality. These trends reflect attempts to find more efficient solutions to
the problems of asymmetric information, risk, insurance, and control of
moral hazard that have traditionally undermined efficiency in health care
markets. Ideally, managed care strategies eliminate care that is not cost jus-
tified (expected marginal benefit less than marginal cost) and hence reduce
deadweight loss. If managed care plans are held to the traditional standard
of customary and ‘‘medically necessary’’ care, the potential efficiency
gains from managed care will not be realized.
Although managed care is associated with increasing assumption of fi-
nancial risk by providers, the conceptual distinction between the insurance
function and the provision of care must be maintained as the basis for sound
liability rules.
The health plan, as the insuring entity (whether or not owned by provid-
ers) should be liable for coverage decisions. Coverage disputes should be
handled as contractual issues, with liability only for breach of contract.
Where the contract lacks explicit guidance, the default rule should be a
cost-benefit standard with benefits defined in terms of willingness-to-pay of
participants in that type of plan.
Health plans should be liable in tort for negligence only in cases of negli-
gent credentialing. Liability for negligent performance should be placed
solely on the individual provider, who is usually best placed to make and
monitor precautions in the delivery of medical care. Adding liability of
plans, under theories of vicarious, agency, or enterprise liability, serves
only to add an additional deep pocket defendant. To the extent that this in-
creases the frequency of erroneous findings of liability, the ability of man-
aged care to control insurance-induced overuse and improve efficiency in
health care delivery will be obstructed.
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However, contractual shifting of liability between provider and plans, as
in the assumption by staff model HMOs of the liability of their physicians,
should be permitted. Given the heterogeneity of plan types and organiza-
tional forms, permitting plans and providers to contractually shift liability
offers potential efficiency gains. By contrast, a uniform system of placing
enterprise liability on plans, either instead of or in addition to liability on
individual providers, is likely to obstruct the ongoing evolution toward
more efficient forms of health insurance and delivery systems.
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